Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Tavis McArthur v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stuart H. Schultz; Strong & Hanni; attorney for appellee.
A. Bryce Dixon; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McArthur v. State Farm, No. 20100847 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2564

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
——00O00—

Tavis McArthur,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20100847-SC

State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company
Defendant and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Regarding Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals
For the Tenth Circuit
Case No. 09-4239
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Stuart H. Schultz
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Ste 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Attorney for Appellee

A. Bryce Dixon
20 N. Main Street, Suitd lk
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: 435-652-80^0
Attorney for
Tavis McArtljtfU, Appel|aiM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

Tavis McArthur,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20100847-SC

State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company
Defendant and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Regarding Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals
For the Tenth Circuit
Case No. 09-4239
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Stuart H. Schultz
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, Ste 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Attorney for Appellee

A. Bryce Dixon
20 N. Main Street, Suite 205
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: 435-652-8000
Attorney for
Tavis McArthur, Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

II.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

7

III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

8

IV.
CITATION TO RECORD SHOWING PRESERVATION OF RECORD ON
APPEAL

9

V.
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
TO THE APPEAL
10
VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

10

VII.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

13

VIII.

ARGUMENT

16

A.

THE EXHAUSTION CLAUSE IS A HARSH, TECHNICAL PENALTY
THAT VIOLATES THE INTERESTS OF THE INSURED
16

B.

THE MAJORITY OF U.S. JURISDICTIONS REJECT THE
EXHAUSTION CLAUSE

20

C.

UTAH'S UIM STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION

21

D.

UTAH'S SINGLE STATUTORY REFERENCE TO POLICY LIMITS
APPLIES ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUBROGATION RIGHTS
OF THE UIM CARRIER WHICH ARE OF NEGLIGIBLE PRACTICAL
VALUE
22

E.

THE WESTERN STATES WHO HAVE REJECTED THE EXHAUSTION
CLAUSE ON PUBLIC POLICY ALL HAVE STATUTORY
REFERENCES TO "POLICY LIMITS."
28

F.

STATE FARM HAS NO ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE
EXHAUSTION CLAUSE BECAUSE THE UIM CARRIER IS GIVEN
CREDIT FOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE LIABILITY POLICY
LIMITS EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT OBTAINED THOSE
LIMITS
39

1

G.
H.

IX.

UTAH PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS VITIATION OF THE
EXHAUSTION CLAUSE

40

STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO. V. GREEN, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3D
97, 104 (SUP. CT. 2003)'S HOLDING SUGGESTS AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY OF DECISION
41

CONCLUSION

42

2

I.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Abberton v. Colonial Penn Insurance Company, 421 So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)

37

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Faris, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d 1097 (1989)

20

Augustine v. Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116 (1997)

15, 16, 20

Augustine v. Simonson, 940 P. 2d 116, 119 (Mont Sup. Ct. 1997)

18

Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 295 N.J. Super. 613, 685 A.2d 975 (1996)

20

Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Ohio 1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d 447, 451
19
Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d 447 (1988)

20

Brown v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 547 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)

20

Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 1991 OK 127, 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991)

20

Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1997)

21

Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 588-589 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)

20

Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)

30

Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 7 P.3d 973 (2000)

20

Curran v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 832 (Alaska 2001)

22

Curran v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 834 (Alaska 2001)

21

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 16 Cal. App. 4th 797, 802-803 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999) 21
Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2002 Ohio 7217, 781 N.E.2d
927(2002)
20
Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 Wn. 2d 721, 733 P.2d 213 (1987) 21,31
Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 721, 733 (Wash. 1987)

33

Hammv. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 2000)

21

Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 215 W. Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004)
3

20, 39

Iron Head Constr., Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, PI3 (Utah 2009)

40

Leal v. Northwestern Nat'l County Mut. Ins. Co., 846 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) 21
LeFranc v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 382 (R.I. 1991)

21

Linebaugh v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 224 Mich. App. 494, 569 N.W.2d 648 (1997).... 20
Mann v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620 (1992)

17

Mann, v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Supreme Court of Nevada, 108 Nev. 648; 836
P.2d 620 (1992)
20
McDonald v. Republic-Franklin Ins. Co. (Ohio 1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 27, 543 N.E.2d 456.
19
Metcalfv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 S.W.2d 151, 44 6 Ky. L. Summary 6 (Ky.
Ct.App. 1997)
20
Mont. Code Anno., § 33-23-201

33

New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987)

36

New Jersey, Longworth v. Van Houten 223 N.J. Super. 174, 538A.2d414 (1988)

23

Omni Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 802 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 2001)

20

Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)

20, 23, 33

Parents against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeowners' Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 55
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)
41
Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999, 1003 (1900)

41

Rucker, 442 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1989)

20

Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co., 18 Utah 66, 73 (Utah 1898)

40

Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983)

20, 23, 33

Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256, 260,261 (Minn. 1983)

24

Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,263 (Minn. 1983)

34

Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451 Pa. Super. 507, 680 A.2d 881 (1996)

21

Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 279 Mont. 291, 927 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1996)

15

4

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo, 873 P.2d 47, (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)

20, 31

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97 (Sup. Ct. 2003).... 15, 27
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) ..35
Sunderland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 717 A.2d 53 (R.I. 1998)

21

Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 90 Hawaii 302, 978 P.2d 740 (1999)

20

Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918 P.2d 95 (1996)

36

Statutes
28U.S.C. §1332

7

28U.S.C. §1332(a)

7

28U.S.C.A. §1291

7

A.R.S. § 20-259.01

30

A.R.S. §20-259.01(G)

30

C.R.S. 10-4-609

32

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 687B.145, Arizona (A.R.S. § 20-259.01)

33

RCW 48.22.030(2)

31

Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 48.22.030

33

Section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes

36

U.C.A. 31A-22-305.3(5)(a)

34

UCA31A-22-305.3(2)(b)

40

UCA31A-22-305.3(2)(g)

40

Utah Code Annotated section 31 A-22-305.3 (b)(i)

29

5

Other Authorities
F.R.A.P3and4

7

F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)(A)

7

6

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
A. Plaintiffs filed this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, on the basis of Diversity of Citizenship
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332, Mr. McArthur being a resident of
Utah and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(State Farm) not. Mr. McArthur suffered personal injuries and
medical and hospital expenses such that this case has an
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00 exclusive of
interest and costs and exceeding the sum specified by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a).
B. The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to State
Farm and deny Mr. McArthur's motion for summary judgment
resulted in a final judgment in favor of State Farm. Under 28
U.S.C.A. §1291 and F.R.A.P 3 and 4 this judgment was
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which accepted
jurisdiction.
C. The trial court's memorandum and decision was entered on
December 9, 2009. Mr. McArthur filed his notice of appeal on
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December 29, 2009 within the time limits set by F.R.A.P.
4(a)(1)(A).
D. This is an appeal from a final judgment that disposes of all
parties' claims.
E. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 21, 2010
ordered state law questions, determinative of the outcome, to be
certified to the Supreme Court of Utah.
F. The Supreme Court of Utah accepted the certification by order
filed December 9, 2010.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Whether the Utah Supreme Court should adopt the majority
view in holding that an exhaustion clause in an insurance policy
providing coverage for Underinsured Motorist Claims (UIM) is
unenforceable, thus preventing insureds like Tavis McArthur
from being hung on the horns of this dilemma: if Mr.
McArthur accepted the final settlement offered by the liability
carrier with a 10% discount from policy limits as the price of
settlement, then he would waive his UIM coverage of $100,000
but, if he sued to collect 100% of the liability coverage, as State
8

Farm (the UIM carrier) insisted, he would be required to spend
years of time and attorney's fees to collect a mere $10,000
which, in his injury-induced impoverishment, he could not
afford to do.
B. If the exhaustion clause of the UIM policy is not generally
unenforceable, whether the enforceability of such exhaustion
clause is contingent upon the insurer establishing actual
prejudice to its economic interest.
C. These are the issues presented as likely dispositive in the
proceedings before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, no Utah
law appearing to control the answers to the certified questions,
restated here as issues.
CITATION TO RECORD SHOWING PRESERVATION OF RECORD
ON APPEAL
A. No such citation is necessary inasmuch as the Tenth Circuit
has certified these questions as determinative of disposition in
that court, which certification presumes that the Tenth Circuit
has already concluded that the issues are preserved on appeal.

9

V.

STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code Annotated (UCA) section 31 A-22-305.3, subsection (5)

provides:
5)(a) Within five business days after notification in a manner
specified by the department that all liability insurers have tendered their
liability policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either:
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may
have against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered
by the liability carrier.
VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case:
Tavis McArthur sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (State Farm) alleging that it had violated its insurance contract by
refusing to consider Mr. McArthur's claim for UIM benefits from which he
desired to satisfy the balance of his $200,000 in personal injury damages.
State Farm alleged that it had no obligation to consider the claim for
$1005000 in UIM benefits because Mr. McArthur had only recovered
10

$90,000 of the $1005000 policy limits of the negligent motorist while the
UIM policy requires exhaustion of liability policy limits as a condition to
recovery of UIM benefits. The trial court ruled on cross motions for
summary judgment that the exhaustion clause was enforceable as written and
did not violate Utah public policy, granting State Farm's summary judgment
and denying Plaintiffs.
B. Statement Of The Facts
Mr. Mc Arthur's complaint alleged the following facts: On August 5,
2007, Mr. McArthur was driving his motorcycle on River Road in St.
George, Utah. As a result of a car crash, Mr. McArthur was thrown from his
motorcycle. Mr. McArthur underwent open reduction and internal fixation of
the 4th and 5th tarsometatarsal joints and open reduction and internal fixation
of the 4th and 5 metatarsophalangeal joints in the left foot. Mr. McArthur's
recovery was delayed by several complications, causing him to seek
treatment for pain management. He continues to suffer pain relentlessly, a
condition known as reflex dystrophy syndrome, sometimes called complex
regional pain syndrome. He received a whole body disability rating of 19%.
Mr. McArthur's contended below that his damages exceeded $200,000.
However, Mr. McArthur alleged that he felt compelled to accept the $90,000
11

final settlement offer from the liability carrier's $100,000 policy limits
because he, not having worked since the accident, could not survive without
immediate funds. His only alternative was to file a lawsuit against the
negligent motorist. However, the cost in time and money for such a suit
would have been much greater than the additional $10,000 insurance he was
entitled to recover for his injuries against the liability carrier of the negligent
motorist.
Mr. McArthur then asserted a claim to collect the $100,000 UIM limits
from his own motorist insurance policy. But State Farm refused to consider
the claim, invoking the exhaustion clause in the UIM policy, which makes
recovery of UIM benefits conditional upon exhausting all policy limits of all
possible liability policies. This, the pertinent language of the exhaustion
clause at issue, is not at issue:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL: 1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF
ALL BODILY INJURY LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT
APPLY HAVE BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OR JUDGMENTS OR
SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER PERSONS . . . .
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The trial court
decided that the facts that Plaintiff had alleged as context for deciding to
12

accept the $90,000 settlement were irrelevant to his decision, ruling that
regardless of those facts, one fact was determinative: that Mr. McArthur's
acceptance of the final $90,000 settlement offer from the liability carrier
precluded him from making a claim for the difference between the liability
policy limits of $100,000 and the UIM limits of $100,000.l
VII.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
State Farm denied Mr. McArthur, already suffering intolerable burdens
because of his injuries and disability, his $100,000 in UIM benefits. State
Farm invoked a harsh and penal exhaustion clause, a provision of Mr.

McArthur's insurance policy which has no economic justification for State
Farm, except for the advantage gained by denying otherwise earned benefits.
The many jurisdictions that have rejected the exhaustion clause have held
that the UIM carrier is given credit for the full policy limits, thus satisfying
every legitimate financial interest of the UIM carrier. The UIM carrier never
loses any money if there is a credit granted because the UIM carrier only
pays out the difference between the liability policy limits and the UIM
obligation.

The facts stated herein were supported by the record and not disputed in
the Tenth Circuit.
13

Of courts deciding the issue, 23 of 30 hold the UIM exhaustion clause
void as against public policy. Neighboring states considering the issue
(Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii)
have expressly ruled in accordance the majority opinion, rejecting the
exhaustion clause. Nearly every court that has not so held bases its decision
on statutory language that requires exhaustion, the prominent examples
being California and Alaska.
Utah's UIM statutes do not require exhaustion of policy limits as do
California's and Alaska's. The Utah UIM statutes expressly define a UIM
situation without reference to policy limits. However, Utah's UIM statutes
make a single reference to "policy limits" but only within the context of
subrogation rights, rights that are practically impossible for a UIM carrier to
exercise effectively. This subrogation right is intended to benefit the UIM
claimant by preventing the UIM carrier from denying claims on the grounds
that the injured person's release precluded the UIM carrier's right of
subrogation.
Most jurisdictions have statutory references to "policy limits," yet they
still hold that public policy invalidates the exhaustion clause.
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Utah public policy, expressed in references both to the beneficial
nature of UIM coverage and to settlement of litigation, demands vitiation of
the exhaustion clause.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97
(Sup. Ct. 2003) indicates that Utah should adopt the majority rule because it
follows the majority rule on the issue of the consent-to-settle clause which
was an early battle ground fought by the insurance industry to attempt to
avoid UIM claims. The majority rule ameliorated the harsh effects of the
consent-to-settle clause by holding that the insured could proceed with the
UIM claim even without obtaining consent unless the insurance company
could prove that it could have collected a subrogation judgment against the
personal assets of the tortfeasor. This majority that Green followed
regarding consent-to-settle uses similar reasoning as that of the majority that
strikes down the exhaustion clause as a technicality. Montana, in Sorensen v.
Farmers Ins. Exch. 279 Mont. 291, 927 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1996), first
decided in favor of the insured on a consent-to-settle case and the next year
then went on to decide in favor of the insured in an exhaustion clause case,
using the reasoning from the consent-to-settle case to support its reasoning
for the exhaustion clause case. Augustine v. Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940
15

P.2d 116 (1997). Since Utah uses the same reasoning in its consent-to-settle
case, it should follow the same path that Montana took in striking down the
exhaustion clause.
Mr. McArthur will show that Utah's UIM statutes are similar to the
statutes of the states that have adopted the majority rule. In fact, Utah's
statutes are more favorable to striking down the exhaustion clause than the
typical statutory scheme of the majority rule. Most of the Western states that
have adopted the majority rule do so in the face of statutes that define UIM
coverage in terms of "limits of liability." The cases cited by State Farm are
not persuasive regarding the Utah statutory scheme.
VIIL

ARGUMENT
A. THE EXHAUSTION CLAUSE IS A HARSH, TECHNICAL PENALTY
THAT VIOLATES THE INTERESTS OF THE INSURED.

As in the instant case, the UIM insurance contract typically includes a
provision that all applicable liability insurance policies must be exhausted
before the UIM carrier is obligated to consider a UIM claim. Nearly all the
courts who have considered the validity of the exhaustion clause, absent
statutory language compelling exhaustion, have condemned the exhaustion
clause as technical, penal and contrary to the beneficial policies that UIM
statutes seek to promote. For example, in Mann v. Farmers Insurance
16

Exchange, 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620 (1992) the Supreme Court of Nevada,
invalidating the exhaustion clause, observed:
The damaged insured is placed in a difficult situation if he or she must
forego all settlement offers and go to trial in order to obtain (or attempt
to obtain) compensation up to the tortfeasor's policy limit — just to
qualify for underinsured benefits under his or her own policy. For
instance, if an insured covered by a policy like Mann's were involved
in an accident with three other drivers, each of whom was responsible
for the accident to a different extent, the insured would have to exhaust
the liability limits of each tortfeasor's policy before pursuing
underinsured motorist benefits. Thus, in this example, even if one of
the drivers was only ten percent at fault, the insured could not settle
with this driver for less than his or her policy limit without giving up
underinsured motorist benefits.
Additionally, if a tortfeasor offers the insured, in good faith, an amount
less than the tortfeasor's policy limit, and the insured has suffered
injuries exceeding the tortfeasor's policy limit, the insured cannot
accept this offer, even if it is close to the tortfeasor's policy limit,
unless the insured is willing to forego underinsured motorist benefits.
Instead, the insured is forced to go to trial, and costs are added while
payment is delayed.
While the Nevada Supreme Court was not faced with the actual
situation of multiple negligent parties it used that hypothetical to underscore
the injustice of the technical application of the exhaustion clause. To cut
down on its payout, every liability carrier wishes to impute even a small
degree of fault to a third party, perhaps only tenuously related to the accident.
If that party has even moderately sized insurance limits, exhaustion will be
2

Mann, supra, involved one negligent party. P. 620
17

impossible, giving pretext for avoidance of the UIM claim. The exhaustion
clause State Farm included in Mr. McArthur's policy, if enforced according
to its terms, would likewise require the exhaustion of the liability policy of a
comparatively negligent party whose negligence contributed only a small
portion of the total fault causative of the accident. For example, a negligent
party's policy may have limits of $300,000 but his or her percentage of the
total fault is only 10%, thus making impossible the exhaustion of policy
limits. This technical application would certainly result in an unjust denial of
UIM benefits.
The Montana Supreme Court in Augustine v. Simonson, 940 P. 2d 116,
119 (Mont Sup. Ct. 1997) voided the exhaustion clause as a "technicality,"
reasoning from a prior decision in this language:
[W]e held that there was no prejudice to the insurer where the tortfeasor was judgment proof and, consequently, the insured's actions
would not compromise the insurer's ability to subrogate. We explained
the meaning of this no prejudice rule as "absent some showing of
material prejudice to the underinsurance carrier, a claim for
underinsured motorist coverage may not be precluded on a
technicality." Sorenszn, 927 P.2d at 1004 (Emphasis added.)

18

The Montana Supreme Court, quoting language from the Ohio Supreme
Court , further reasoned:
Where the amount of settlement is less than the policy limits, the
unpaid amount may well represent the savings in litigation costs for
both sides. More importantly, settlement hastens the payment to the
injured party who obviously needs compensation soon after the
injuries when the medical expenses begin to amass and when the
anxiety level is probably quite high.
Id. at 119, 120
This applies directly to the instant case. Mr. McArthur contended
below that he accepted a $10,000 discount from $100,000 in liability policy
limits because he could not afford to litigate over that small amount. His
medical bills and lost wages "amassing," his physical and financial health in
shambles, his anxiety rising, Mr. McArthur simply could not be reasonably
required to litigate for two or three years, spending over a $100,000 in fees
and costs, to recover a mere $10,000.
Utah public policy, as shown below, is offended by this kind of litigation
gamesmanship. Moreover, Utah decisional law has held that UIM benefits
are not to be denied by "a merely technical" application of UIM policy
language intended to preserve subrogation rights. See State Farm Mut. Auto.
3

Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (Ohio 1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521
N.E.2d 447, 451, modified in part on other grounds, McDonald v. RepublicFranklin Ins. Co. (Ohio 1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 27, 543 N.E.2d 456.
19

Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97, 104 (Sup. Ct. 2003) discussed in
argument section "D" below at page 22.
B. THE MAJORITY OF U.S. JURISDICTIONS REJECT THE
EXHA USTION CLA USE.
The majority of judicial decisions hold the exhaustion clause void4.
This majority includes decisions from the states neighboring Utah—Arizona,
Nevada, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, and Washington5.

4

Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 588-589 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Horace
Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 215 W. Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004); Omni Ins. Co.
v. Foreman, 802 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 2001); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198
Ariz. 167, 7 P.3d 973 (2000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo,
873 P.2d 47, (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506
So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987); Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 90 Hawaii
302, 978 P.2d 740 (1999); In re Rucker, 442 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1989);
Brown v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 547 (Kan. Ct. App.
1992); Metcalfv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 S.W.2d 151, 44 6 Ky.
L. Summary 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Faris, 27 Mass.
App. Ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d 1097 (1989); Linebaugh v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins.
Co., 224 Mich. App. 494, 569 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Schmidt v. Clothier, 338
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Onasch v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Augustine v.
Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940 P.2d 116 (1997); Mann, v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, Supreme Court of Nevada, 108 Nev. 648; 836 P.2d 620 (1992);
Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 295 N.J. Super. 613, 685 A.2d 975
(1996); Bogan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d
447 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Ferrando v. Auto-Owners Mut.
Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St. 3d 186, 2002 Ohio 7217, 781 N.E.2d 927 (2002),
review denied, 98 Ohio St. 3d 1463, 783 N.E.2d 521 (2003) (unpublished
table decision); Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 1991 OK 127, 824 P.2d
1105 (Okla. 1991); Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918
P.2d 95 (1996), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hamm v.
20

Even the cases cited by Defendant, which rely on statutory language
constraining exhaustion, admit that the majority view holds the exhaustion
clause void as against public policy.

See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Hurley, 76

Cal. App. 4th 797, 802-803 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999); Curran v.
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 834 (Alaska 2001).
C. UTAH'S UIM STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE
EXHAUSTION
In cross motions for summary judgment, State Farm relied heavily on
these cases from California and Alaska that ruled in favor of exhaustion.
However, these cases both relied on statutory language that expressly
required exhaustion. California's statutory language is quoted in Hurley,
supra, at p. 800-801:
The provision at issue in this case, section 11580.2(p)(3), provides that
underinsurance coverage "does not apply to any bodily injury until the
limits of bodily injury liability policies applicable to all insured motor
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 2000); Sorter v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 451 Pa. Super. 507, 680 A.2d 881 (1996); LeFranc v.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 382 (R.I. 1991), superseded by statute as
stated in Sunderland v. Allstate Ins. Co., Ill A.2d 53 (R.I. 1998); Cobb v.
Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 S.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1997); Leal v.
Northwestern Natl County Mut. Ins. Co., 846 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993); Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 Wn. 2d 721, 733
P.2d 213 (1987).
Idaho, Wyoming and New Mexico do not have decisions on the
exhaustion clause according to Plaintiffs research.
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vehicles causing the injury have been exhausted by payment of judgments
or settlements, and proof of the payment is submitted to the insurer
providing the underinsured motorist coverage."
Alaska's statutory language is quoted in Curran v. Progressive
Northwestern Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 829, 832 (Alaska 2001):
Under AS 28.20.445, UIM coverage "may not apply to bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death of an insured or damage to or destruction of
property of an insured until the limits of liability of all bodily injury and
property damage liability bonds and policies that apply have been used up
by payments Judgments or settlements." (Emphasis in original.)
Utah has no such language in its UIM statutes. Nowhere does Utah's
code state that UIM coverage may only be obtained if the policy limits of the
tortfeasor are "exhausted" as did California's legislative code or "used up" as
did Alaska's. Nowhere does the Utah Code even define UIM coverage in
terms of that which exceeds the policy limits of the tortfeasor.
D. UTAH'S SINGLE STATUTORY REFERENCE TO POLICY
LIMITS APPLIES ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
SUBROGATION RIGHTS OF THE UIM CARRIER WHICH
ARE OF NEGLIGIBLE PRACTICAL VALUE
Although Utah's statute does not require exhaustion, it does make a
reference to policy limits, but only in connection with the statutory scheme to
preserve the subrogation rights of the UIM carrier in the unlikely event that
subrogation is of any value. Utah Code Annotated (UCA) section 31A-22305.3, subsection (5) provides:
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5) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified
by the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability
policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either:
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may
have against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered
by the liability carrier.
To explain the significance of this reference to policy limits in the
subrogation section of the UIM statutes a little history is necessary.
Originally, UIM statutes6 made no allowance for the right of subrogation
against the at-fault party insured by the liability carrier. This right of
subrogation by traditional principles of insurance law would seem to vest in
the UIM insurance carrier upon paying out a UIM claim. Schmidt (pp. 261263^) and Longworth (pp. 183-185,), supra, describe the problem that arose
when the UIM carrier refused to honor a UIM claim if the claimant had in
settlement granted a release to the tortfreasor. Because such a release
eliminated the subrogation right, the UIM carrier felt justified in refusing to
pay out a UIM claim. Yet the liability carrier would not settle without
receiving a release of its at-fault insured. In order to solve this dilemma,
Minnesota and New Jersey, in decisions that invalidated the exhaustion
6

For example, those of Minnesota discussed in Schmidt v. Clothier, 338
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Onasch v. AutoOwners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), and New Jersey,
Longworth v. Van Houten 223 N.J. Super. 174, 538 A.2d 414 (1988)
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clause, devised judicially a very similar solution to that which Utah devised
statutorily. Courts of these states hold that the subrogation right is preserved
when the injured person tenders the right to the UIM carrier to purchase the
subrogation right by paying the liability carrier's settlement offer, thus
paying the injured person the liability settlement and additionally paying out
the UIM claim. Id. Thereafter, the negligent motorist is subject to personal
liability for the amount that the UIM carrier has paid to its insured on the
UIM coverage.
In judicially creating this right of the UIM earner to pay the liability
amount, Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256, 260,261 (Minn. 1983) holds
that there is no obligation of the claimant to exhaust the liability limits.
Therefore, the preservation of subrogation rights does not necessarily require
a tender of policy limits.
While the Utah statute provides a way for the UIM carrier to
preserve its subrogation rights, the real purpose of this preservation is to
prevent the UIM carrier from doing what it tried to do in Minnesota and
New Jersey, that is, avoid paying the UIM claim by confounding an
injured person with an unsolvable dilemma. Therefore, Utah's
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subrogation statute ought to be construed to benefit the UIM claimant, not as
a technical excuse for the UIM carrier to avoid payment.
Moreover, this subrogation right is of nearly no value to the UIM carrier,
almost never being actually preserved by following the statutory or judicially
created procedure because it has no practical value . The reasons are obvious
and undisputed.
First, the UIM carrier would have to pay to its insured both the liability
settlement amount and then its UIM coverage as well. Then the UIM carrier
would have to sue the negligent motorist to try to recover the sum of those
two amounts. The liability carrier would then defend that suit. After years of
litigation and likely spending over a $100,000 in attorney's fees and expert
witness costs, the UIM carrier would have to go trial to obtain a judgment.
The UIM carrier would be required to go to trial because the liability carrier
will not settle for an amount in excess of its policy limits. Yet that excess
amount is the very UIM payout for which the UIM carrier seeks subrogation.
Thus, the UIM carrier must incur the expense of paying the liability
settlement, then incur the substantial expense of litigation to verdict and if it

Mr. McArthur argued this point below without opposition from State
Farm. Had discovery been permitted, this would have been one area
explored.
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then finally gets a judgment against the tortfeasor, il must seek to collect the
excess judgment from his or her personal assets, if he or she has not filed
bankruptcy or transferred them to an asset protection trust.
In this case, for example, State Farm would be faced with about a
$100,000 in attorney's fees and costs of litigation for the right to get a
personal judgment against the at-fault driver for $100,000 in excess of
liability policy limits which it probably could never collect. Obviously,
insurance carriers do not engage in such speculative waste of their resources.
Therefore, the Utah code's reference to policy limits, tied only to the
subrogation scheme, in a context entirely unrelated to the substantive
operation of the UIM claim, does not constitute an expression of the public
policy of Utah on the issue of exhaustion. It certainly is not a sufficiently
clear statement to overcome the unjust effects and public policy concerns of
the exhaustion clause that other the majority view has convincingly asserted.
The context of this reference to "policy limits" implies nothing regarding the
validity of the exhaustion clause. There is no evidence that this reference to
policy limits is anything more than a convenient way to express what the
typical subrogation situation confronting that UIM carrier would look like.
8

After the judgment the liability carrier would pay its $100,000 in policy
limits for a total of $200,000.
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That is because the great majority of UIM claims probably follow exhaustion
of policy limits even in states where such exhaustion is not required.
If a court must give strict deference to the language, it could be read to
require UIM insurance carriers to rely on liability settlement of policy limits
only if there is a reasonable basis for making a subrogation claim. It could be
construed to mean that if the Plaintiff obtains a policy limits settlement, then
it can insist that within five days, the UIM carrier either waive subrogation or
pay the policy limits. However, if the injured person desires to take less than
policy limits, he or she loses the right to demand the waiver of subrogation
within five days. The injured person would have to obtain the consent of the
UIM carrier to settle for less than policy limits or the plaintiff could still
recover UIM coverage if he or she can show that the UIM carrier could not
actually collect a subrogation judgment. Utah law excuses the plaintiff from
making the five day demand where the UIM carrier cannot actually collect its
subrogation claim. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48,
89 P.3d 97 (Sup. Ct. 2003) the court ruled that the consent to settle clause as
used by a UIM carrier to avoid payment of UIM benefits was ineffective
unless the UIM carrier could show that it was prejudiced by the refusal to
obtain the right of consent, thus, in effect, requiring the UIM carrier to prove
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that it could have actually collected a subrogation judgment.

At page 104

the court reasoned:
We agree with Green and join those courts holding that the breach of
consent to settle exclusion is material only if it results in actual, rather
than theoretical, impairment of an insurer's ability to recover through
subrogation. The purpose of UIM coverage is to provide a source of
indemnification for accident victims when the tortfeasor does not have
adequate coverage. Denying coverage to an accident victim on the
basis of a merely technical breach that has no effect on the
insurer's ability to recover through subrogation does not further
that purpose. (Emphasis added.)
This language has direct applicability to the instant case. This Honorable
Court has held that it would not countenance the denial of UIM benefits by
operation of a "merely technical breach" such as the acceptance of the
$90,000 instead of the $100,000 policy limits because such technical breach
did not affect State Farm's ability to recover through subrogation.
E. THE WESTERN STATES WHO HAVE REJECTED THE
EXHAUSTION CLAUSE ON PUBLIC POLICY ALL HAVE
STATUTORY REFERENCES TO "POLICY LIMITS."
The essence of State Farm's argument boils down to the proposition
that Utah statutory law has expressed a public policy in favor of the
exhaustion clause because of the mere mention of the phrase, "policy limits,'
in the UIM statute. This therefore begs an analysis of the statutes of the
states that have followed the majority rule in rejecting the exhaustion clause.
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Mr. Mc Arthur will first concentrate his efforts on the Western jurisdictions
neighboring Utah.
1.

Definitional Statutes Analyzed

State Farm first argues that Utah Code Annotated section 31A-22305.3 (b)(i), which defines an uninsured motor vehicle, requires exhaustion.
It provides that an "[u]nderinsured motor vehicle' includes a motor vehicle ..
. which has insufficient liability coverage . . . ."
Nevada's counterpart to 31A-22-305.3 (b)(i), found at Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 687B.145, reads as follows:
Uninsured and underinsured vehicle coverage must include a provision
which enables the insured to recover up to the limits of his own
coverage any amount of damages for bodily injury from his insurer
which he is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of
the other vehicle to the extent that those damages exceed the limits of
the coverage for bodily injury carried by that owner or operator.
[Emphasis added.]
The Nevada Supreme Court struck down the exhaustion clause,
notwithstanding explicit reference to policy "limits" in its UIM statute.
Significantly, the Utah statute defining UIM coverage never refers to policy
limits but refers to "insufficient liability coverage." Utah's statue is
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therefore, less compelling than Nevada's for the argument that its statutory
language demands acceptance of the exhaustion clause.
Arizona's statutory scheme at A.R.S. § 20-259.01 also defines
underinsured motorist coverage in terms of liability limits:
"Underinsured motorist coverage" includes coverage for a person if the
sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury or death liability
bonds and liability insurance policies applicable at the time of the
accident is less than the total damages for bodily injury or death
resulting from the accident. To the extent that the total damages
exceed the total applicable liability limits, the underinsured motorist
coverage provided in subsection B of this section is applicable to the
difference.
Addressing the issue of whether this statutory language justified the
exhaustion clause, Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 170 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2000) held:
The explanation of UIM coverage in A.R.S. § 20-259.01(G) does not
provide for exhaustion of a tort-feasor's liability coverage before UIM
benefits come into play. Rather, it speaks of the "limits of liability"
under "liability bonds and liability insurance policies applicable at the
time of the accident. . . . " It provides that UIM coverage is applicable
"to the extent that the total damages exceed the total applicable
liability limits. . . . " As stated in the statute, entitlement to UIM
benefits is based on damages that exceed the applicable liability limits
rather than being based on payment or exhaustion of those limits; the
statutory language does not require exhaustion of the applicable
liability limits as a precondition to payment of UIM benefits. Thus,
only language in Country Mutual's policy, not language in the statute,
requires exhaustion of the tort-feasor's liability policy before [*** 11]
damages that exceed the liability policy limits will be paid under the
UIM coverage.
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The Arizona court held that the reference to "limits of liability" only means
that the UIM carrier is entitled to constructive exhaustion or a credit for the
total liability limits. This constructive exhaustion concept is discussed in
more detail below at section F.
Washington also ruled with the majority in Hamilton v. Farmers Ins,
Co. of Washington, 107 Wn. 2d 721, 733 P.2d 213 (1987) that the exhaustion
clause was void as against public policy, although its statute uses "limits of
liability" in defining an underinsured motorist:
RCW 48.22.030(2) provides in part: An
f

'[u]nderinsured motor vehicle1' is defined as a vehicle with insufficient
insurance to compensate the plaintiffs damages:
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle with respect to
the ownership, maintenance, or use of which either no bodily injury or
property damage liability bond or insurance policy applies at the time
of an accident, or with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability
under all bodily injury or property damage liability bonds and
insurance policies applicable to a covered person after an accident is
less than the applicable damages which the covered person is legally
entitled to recover. [As quoted in Hamilton v. Farmers, Id. at 216.
Emphasis in the court's citation.]
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bencomo, 873 P.2d 47, (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994) held the exhaustion clause void as against the public policy of
Colorado, even though the Colorado statutes also defined underinsured
motorists coverage in terms of policy limits: "C.R.S. 10-4-609: "[UIM] .. .
31

coverage . . . shall cover the difference, if any, between the amount of the
limits of any legal liability coverage and the amount of the damages
sustained,. .. ."
Utah's statutory language never employs the phrase "limits of
liability" in defining an underinsured motorist vehicle.

Even its reference to

"insufficient liability coverage" is found in a non-exclusive definition.
Utah's statute says that an "underinsured motor vehicle includes" one with
"insufficient liability coverage." 31A-22-305.3 (b)(i). The word "includes"
leaves open the possibility that the court could find UIM coverage other than
in the exact language of Section 31 A-22-305.3(l )(b)(i). Therefore, the Utah
legislature was careful not to pin down too exactly the definition of a vehicle
entitled to underinsured motorist coverage, suggesting that the legislature
desired to define UIM coverage broadly, subject to certain specific
restrictions, but otherwise leaving open to the courts the option to do justice
according to the beneficial purposes of the statute.
If, in the several Western states cited above, the use of the phrase
"limits of liability" in the definitional sections of their UIM statutes did not
preclude vitiation of the exhaustion clause, then certainly in Utah the mere
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reference to policy limits in a tangential section of the UIM code relating to
subrogation should not have that effect either.
2.

The Statutory Provision for the Consumer to Opt Out of UIM
Coverage Has no Effect on the Exhaustion Clause in the Western
States

State Farm argues that Utah's statutory mandate that each insurance
carrier offer all motorists UIM coverage is not a strong public policy because
the consumer can opt out of the coverage. However, that argument once
again fails to prevail under the majority view. Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 687B.145, Arizona (A.R.S. § 20-259.01), Washington (Rev. Code Wash.
(ARCW) § 48.22.030), Colorado (C.R.S. 10-4-609) and Montana (Mont.
Code Anno., § 33-23-201 all allow the motorists to opt out of the mandatory
offer of UIM coverage. Nevertheless, their courts find the UIM statutes to
express a strong public policy, inconsistent with the exhaustion clause.
3. How does Utah's treatment of the UIM carrier's right of
subrogation compare to other Western states?
Washington in Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co., 107 Wn.2d 721, 733
(Wash. 1987) adopted the rule of Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256
(Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins.
Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), that the UIM carrier could
preserve a right of subrogation if it paid the liability claim before releasing
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the tortfeasor. It held that any other application of the right of subrogation
would undermine the purposes of the UIM statute. Thus, Washington, like
Minnesota, has effected judicially what Utah has done statutorily: the
protection of the UIM insured from having his UIM coverage denied under
the pretext of the violation of subrogation rights. However, Minnesota
granted the UIM carrier 30 days notice to decide whether to step into the
shoes of the liability carrier in order to preserve its right of subrogation.
Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,263 (Minn. 1983). Utah law is not
nearly as generous at five days. U.C.A. 31A-22-305.3(5)(a).
Nevada simply denies the underinsurer the right of subrogation. Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 687B.145. Arizona's statue gives the UIM carrier a two
year limitations period in which to bring an action for subrogation or
reimbursement. It does not impose a five-day deadline to pay the liability
claim or waive its right of subrogation. It is unclear how Arizona has solved
the subrogation dilemma. Its protection of the insurer's right of subrogation
is more extensive than Utah's and yet it still adopted the majority rule.
Montana seems to have no subrogation statute but relies on a case
similar to Utah's State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104,
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2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) to prevent injustice to the insured. See
discussion above at pp. 15 and 27.
Utah's statute seems unique to the West, although Oregon currently
has a somewhat similar provision. Subsection (D) of Oregon Revised
Statutes 742.504(d) requires the insured to obtain consent to settle or to
protect the insured's right of subrogation if the insured obtains a settlement
less than policy limits.9 Oregon had, under a previous applicable statute,

9

ORS § 742.504 (d): This coverage does not appl)T with respect to
underinsured motorist benefits unless:
(A) The limits of liability under any bodily injury liability insurance
applicable at the time of the accident regarding the injured person have been
exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements to the injured person or
other injured persons;
(B) The described limits have been offered in settlement, the insurer has
refused consent under paragraph (a) of this subsection and the insured
protects the insurer's right of subrogation to the claim against the tortfeasor;
(C) The insured gives credit to the insurer for the unrealized portion of the
described liability limits as if the full limits had been received if less than the
described limits have been offered in settlement, and the insurer has
consented under paragraph (a) of this subsection; or
(D) The insured gives credit to the insurer for the unrealized portion of the
described liability limits as if the full limits had been received if less than the
described limits have been offered in settlement and, if the insurer has
refused consent under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the insured protects
the insurer's right of subrogation to the claim against the tortfeasor.
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adopted the majority view regarding the exhaustion clause. Vega v. Farmers
Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918 P.2d 95 (1996).
The one case in the country whose statute mentions "liability
limits" in the subrogation context rejects the exhaustion clause as against
public policy.
Florida has a similar statutory solution to the subrogation dilemma in
which policy limits are mentioned but it, nevertheless, holds with the
majority rule in striking down the exhaustion clause. New Hampshire Ins.
Co. v. Knight, 506 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987) quotes the statute:
Section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes provides:
(6) If an injured person or, in the case of death, the personal
representative agrees to settle a claim with a liability insurer and its
insured for the limits of liability, and such settlement would not fully
satisfy the claim for personal injuries or wrongful death so as to create
an underinsured motorist claim against the underinsured motorist
insurer, then such settlement agreement shall be submitted in writing
to the underinsured motorist insurer, which shall have a period of 30
days from receipt thereof in which to agree to arbitrate the
underinsured motorist claim and approve the settlement, waive its
subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured, and
authorize the execution of a full release. If the underinsured motorist
insurer does not agree within 30 days to arbitrate the underinsured
motorist claim and approve the proposed settlement agreement, waive
its subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured, and
authorize the execution of a full release, the injured person or, in the
ORS § 742.504
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case of death, the personal representative may file suit joining the
liability insurer's insured and the underinsured motorist insurer to
resolve their respective liabilities for any damages to be awarded;
however, in such action, the liability insurer's coverage must first be
exhausted before any award may be entered against the underinsured
motorist insurer, and any such award against the underinsured motorist
insurer shall be excess and subject to the provisions of subsection (1).
Any award in such action against the liability insurer's insured is
binding and conclusive as to the injured person and underinsured
motorist insurer's liability for damages up to its coverage limits.
[Emphasis added]
Then the court rejected the argument that this language compelled
acceptance of the exhaustion clause:
New Hampshire argues that this section explicitly requires that
the tort-feasor's policy limits be first exhausted before a claim can be
made for underinsured coverage. This contention has been squarely
rejected by other courts which have considered it. In Abberton v.
Colonial Perm Insurance Company, All So.2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982),
cert denied, 430 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1983) the court said:
"The enactment of this section had no effect on section
627.727(1) which still provides that the coverage is over and above but
shall not duplicate the benefits available to an insured." [Emphasis in
original].
The Florida courts confronted with a statutory provision similar to that
of Utah and an argument that such statute validates the exhaustion clause
expressly rejected the argument, striking down the exhaustion clause,
reasoning that their statutes should be construed to do justice and not to
enshrine the exhaustion clause by some technical reference to policy limits, a
reference found only in the context of subrogation rights. Clearly, the
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Florida courts construe the legislative language in the subrogation scheme to
be merely representative of the typical situation and not an endorsement of
the exhaustion clause. This seems to be the only case directly on this point.
Notwithstanding the variety of treatments of subrogation, one thing
remains clear. The statutory and case law treatment of subrogation arise out
of the need to protect the UIM insured from the ploy of using subrogation to
deny benefits. It would be against public policy for a statute designed to
protect the consumer to be used to deny him or her benefits on a technical
basis.
State Farm has not born its burden to show that the public policy
interests expressed in the majority rule are any different in Utah. Rather, Mr.
McArthur has shown that the same public policy interests expressed as
justification for the majority's vitiation of the exhaustion clause appear
prominently in Utah's case and statutory law: avoidance of litigation,
promotion of settlement and the mandatory and beneficial nature of UIM
coverage. Utah's statutory scheme falls in line with the statutes of the cases
that adopted the majority view.
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F. STATE FARM HAS NO ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE
EXHA USTION CLA USE EEC A USE THE UIM CARRIER IS
GIVEN CREDIT FOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE
LIABILITY POLICY LIMITS EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS
NOT OBTAINED THOSE LIMITS
The many jurists who have rejected the exhaustion clause have held
that the UIM carrier is given credit for the full policy limits. (See for example
the Nevada and Montana cases cited above.) The majority rule sometimes
calls this "constructive exhaustion." Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 215 W.
Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004).
In explanation of the credit consider this hypothetical. Assume that
Mr. McArthur's total personal injury recovery at trial is $180,000. State
Farm would only have to pay $80,000 because it would get a credit for the
full $100,000 although Mr. McArthur only received $90,000 from the
liability carrier. Mr. McArthur would have received the $90,000 from the
liability carrier and $80,000 from his own UIM carrier for a total of
$170,000, yielding a sacrifice of the $10,000 in liability limits that he
relinquished to obtain a quick settlement. This arrangement satisfies entirely
the legitimate interest of the UIM carrier and fulfills the intent of the
language of the exhaustion clause. The UIM carrier never loses any money if
there is a credit granted. Moreover, the insured has every incentive to
maximize his recovery against the liability policy.
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G. UTAH PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS VITIATION OF THE
EXHA USTION CLA USE.
Utah law favors UIM insurance, considering it so important that it
requires an insurance company to give UIM coverage to every person in the
state of Utah who drives a motor vehicle. See UCA 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b).
Subsection (2)(d) provides for minimum limits of UIM coverage. The statute
also provides that an insured may only avoid UIM coverage by an express
written form that "includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of the
underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be applicable." UCA
31A-22-305.3(2)(g).
Moreover, Utah's strong public policy to encourage settlement and
discourage litigation supports vitiation of the exhaustion clause. Iron Head
Constr., Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, P13 (Utah 2009) referred to "Utah's
clear public policy of encouraging settlements." This public policy has
remained firm for many years. In 1898 Sandberg v. Victor Gold & Silver
Mining Co., 18 Utah 66, 73 (Utah 1898) observed: "It is always desirable,
and in harmony with public policy, that parties to a controversy should be
permitted to make a bona fide settlement of their difficulties, and courts are
not inclined to favor a lien which may be used as an instrument to embarrass
or prevent such settlement.'5 Parents against Drunk Drivers v. Graystone
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Pines Homeowners1 Ass% 789 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) stated: a In
an early case, the Utah Supreme Court held a contractual provision granting
an attorney control over the settlement of a lawsuit void as against public
policy. Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999, 1003 (1900). The
court found such settlement control provisions run afoul of the policy to
encourage settlements of causes and differences between persons. 61 P. at
1003."
H. STATE FARMMUT AUTO. INS. CO. V. GREEN, 2003 UT48,
89P.3D 97,104 (SUP. CT. 2003)'S HOLDING SUGGESTS AN
ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF DECISION.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97, 104
(Sup. Ct. 2003) held that UIM benefits should not be avoided where the UIM
carrier suffers no real prejudice. As shown above, especially as shown by the
path that Montana took, this holding is consistent with the majority rule that
rejects the exhaustion clause as against public policy. However, another
view of its holding suggests that, rather than a rule that vitiates all exhaustion
clauses, a Green type analysis may be applied on a case-by-case basis. In
Green, dealing with the consent-to-settle clause, the UIM carrier must prove
that it suffered prejudice by the claimant's failure to obtain consent-to-settle.
If the UIM carrier can prove prejudice, then the UIM coverage is avoided,
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although that proof would be extremely difficult to marshal. So in the
exhaustion clause case the UIM carrier might be required to prove that it has
been prejudiced by the settlement of the liability case for less than policy
limits. The same principles of Green would apply. This would be a variant
from the majority rule.
IX.

CONCLUSION
Nothing in Utah's statutory scheme militates against adoption of the
majority rule that holds the exhaustion clause void as against public policy.

Rather, Utah's statutory scheme is more conducive to the reasoning of the
majority rule than the statutes of the other Western states that have so ruled.
Moreover, this Honorable Court's precedent in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, 89 P.3d 97, 104 (Sup. Ct. 2003) clearly indicates
that Utah should adopt the majority rule because said case followed the
majority in preventing UIM carriers from precluding UIM claims on the
basis of the consent-to-settle clause.
This Honorable Court should so certify to the Tenth Circuit, that Utah law
holds that the exhaustion clause is void or, in the alternative, if generally
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enforceable the UIM carrier must nevertheless prove that it is actually
prejudiced by the failure of the insured to obtain policy limits.
Dated this Jio day of February, 2011
Dixon, Truman, Fisher & Clifford, P.C.
/s/ A. Bryce Dixon
A. Bryce Dixon
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